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SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE MORAL
OBLIGATION OF DIRECTORS
Mark J. Loewenstein* and Jay Geyer**
ABSTRACT
One of the most written-about and important topics in corporate law
is the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors. Increasingly,
critics of American capitalism have urged that corporations, and
implicitly, corporate directors, act in a more socially responsible
fashion and thus eschew the notion that shareholder primacy is the
exclusive guide to a director’s fiduciary duty. Under this view,
directors must consider the effect of their actions on “stakeholders”
other than shareholders and be guided by morality—doing the right
thing—when making business judgments.
When directors move away from shareholder primacy, however,
decision-making becomes more difficult and problematic. This
article analyzes the arguments that underpin a rejection of
shareholder primacy, alternatives to shareholder primacy, and the
utility of morality as a guide for directors making business
judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate directors are under increasing pressure from outside of
their corporations, and sometimes from their shareholders, to be more
socially responsible.1 What that pressure demands is not altogether clear,
but assume, for now, that there is a general consensus as to what
constitutes a socially responsible corporation. The conventional wisdom
is that directors in a typical business corporation are free to act in a
socially responsible fashion if they can justify it as a business judgment
in the best interests of the corporation.2 As long as that justification is
provided, the courts are loathe to second-guess the directors, and almost
never have, unless there was no rational basis for the chosen course of
action.3 Still, the directors’ freedom of action is easier if the applicable
law—the business corporation statute under which the corporation is

1. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 212 n.19 (1995).
2. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
3. Id.
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organized—includes an “other-constituency” provision.4 This provision
expressly allows directors to consider the impact of a potential course of
action on constituencies other than the shareholders, including
employees, consumers, suppliers, and the community or communities in
which the corporation does business. A course of action can be justified
even if it is not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, if another constituency benefits or is harmed by an
alternative course of action the directors might have chosen.5 The recent
advent of “benefit corporations” adds yet another layer to this inquiry;
directors of a benefit corporation must take into account the impact of
their chosen courses of action on the environment and society at large,
as well as the “other constituencies” noted above.6
The justifications for unmooring directors from their traditional
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders are many and
varied. Some turn on the great wealth and power amassed by the modern
corporation. Under this justification, corporations must, as a matter of
necessity, act in a socially responsible fashion.7 Other justifications
focus more on the impact that corporations have on society: Its
proponents reason that corporations must therefore act to preserve and
enhance societal goals.8 These and other arguments, described below,
are, essentially, arguments by assertion: The proponents justify the
result because it is the result that they want. What is lacking is an
analysis explaining why and how directors should behave in the way
that these critics want them to behave.
This article grapples with this fundamental question from three
perspectives. First, we consider the developing scholarship on
“stakeholder theory,” an approach to corporate governance that holds
that directors should consider the interests of persons and groups that are
affected by, or that affect, a corporation. Second, we consider the moral
autonomy of directors; should directors be free to consult their own
moral and ethical principles in deciding corporate matters? The answers
4. Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got What it
Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 249, 249–50 (2010).
5. Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 882 (2017).
6. Leo E. Strine, Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?,
4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245–46 (2014).
7. See BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE
PUBLIC 42–43 (2019).
8. Jeffrey Nesteruk, Corporations, Shareholders, and Moral Choice: A New
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 451, 453–54
(1989).
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may seem obvious, but operationalizing these individual moral
judgments in a way that can be captured by the law is difficult, if not
impossible. We thus consider in this context the analogous issue of a
lawyer’s duty to zealously represent her client when such representation
conflicts with a lawyer’s personal moral judgment.
We then turn to a third rationale to justify a non-profit-maximizing
approach to corporate governance, as set forth in Professor Joseph
Heath’s recent book, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM.9 Heath
calls for a “market failures approach” to business ethics: When there is a
market failure, managers may not exploit that failure and, instead,
should seek to do the right thing.10 A close analysis of this approach,
however, suggests that it is more efficient to change the law to address
market failures than to depend on the good will of corporate managers.
Before concluding, we contrast these approaches to the corporate law
that underpins the legitimacy of director conduct in the first instance;
that is, the fiduciary relationship between the directors and the
shareholders, beautifully articulated in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas
Corp.11 How do these principles inform directors as to how they might
act in a socially responsible way? Prior to considering these alternative
approaches to director decision-making, it is important to set out the
conventional understanding and, probably, the predominant norm for
director conduct, the idea of shareholder primacy as a guiding principle
and a manifestation of the ideas expressed in Blasius.
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Shareholder primacy is the theory in corporate law that the
fiduciary duty of directors obligates them to make decisions that
promote shareholder wealth maximization.12 Shareholders are the
principals on whose behalf the firm is organized and are, at least in a
sense, its owners. The idea of ownership, though controversial, rests on
9. See generally JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE
MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (2014).
10. Id. at 90.
11. 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988).
12. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277–78
(1998); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006).
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the notion that under state corporate law, the shareholders elect the
directors of the corporation and can enforce the directors’ fiduciary
duties through derivative litigation.13 Consistent with the idea of
ownership, early cases often refer to directors as trustees for the
shareholders, implying that the directors managed property “owned” by
their beneficiaries, the shareholders.14 In contrast to the shareholders,
other constituents of the firm, such as employees and suppliers, depend
on contracts (explicit or implicit) to define their rights. Shareholders
lack explicit contracts and, to realize a return on their investment,
depend on the directors to maximize the value of the firm.15
The idea of shareholder ownership of the firm is controversial, or at
least subject to challenge, because the traditional indicia of ownership
are lacking. Technically, shareholders only own shares of stock, which
ownership includes certain rights defined by statute, principally the right
to elect directors, approve or veto fundamental corporate changes (for
example, mergers, amendments to the articles of incorporation,
dissolution), and receive the residual value of the firm on liquidation.16
Scholars, who dispute the idea that shareholders own the corporation,
note that shareholders lack control over the firm’s assets and lack power
to direct those who do, the directors.17 In addition, as a practical matter,
shareholders face considerable hurdles in electing directors beyond
nominating the directors themselves.18 In publicly held corporations, the
directors use corporate resources to prepare and circulate proxy
statements to solicit proxies for their own election.19 Shareholders do not
have access to these proxy statements (unless the bylaws so provide)
and must bear the considerable expense of soliciting proxies
themselves.20
The right to bring derivative litigation must also be considered in
context. Just as it is difficult for shareholders to exercise their right to
elect directors, it is also difficult for them to discipline directors through
13.
14.

Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1748.
See Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the
Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 39 (2015); see also Gray v.
President of Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 378–79 (1807).
15. Weitzel & Rodgers, supra note 14, at 40.
16. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 564–65 (2003).
17. Id. at 574.
18. Id. at 569.
19. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1737–38.
20. Id. at 1735.
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derivative litigation. Procedural hurdles,21 the ability of directors to
dismiss the litigation,22 and the business judgment rule23 all make
derivative litigation difficult and expensive. Under the business
judgment rule, courts do not review the business judgments of directors
unless the directors were conflicted or utterly failed to inform
themselves when they made their decision.24 The shareholders who
challenge directors’ business judgments bear the burden of proving the
conflict or breach of the duty of care.
Although directors still regard shareholders as the most important
constituency, recently some directors have admitted that they factor
other constituencies into their decision making.25 These directors explain
that strict shareholder primacy may discourage non-shareholder
constituents from making the types of firm-specific investments that can
be essential to a company’s success.26 For example, a board of directors
can make the decision to maximize shareholder wealth by selling the
firm to the highest bidder. Or, taking into consideration the effects of the
acquisition on non-shareholder constituents such as managers and other
employees, the board can choose to sell to a lower bidder who offers
commitments to those groups. If employees and managers really believe
that the board of directors will sell to the highest bidder and not take
their interests into account, then managers and employees will not
devote themselves to the firm.27 Since an ex-ante policy of considering
the effect of a sale on employees encourages firm-specific investment, it
can be argued that it is consistent with shareholder primacy, that is, it is
in the best interest of shareholders as a class over the long run.28
However, in the short run, it affords directors discretion to refuse to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders of a particular firm at a

21. Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461,
525 (1992).
22. Id. at 505.
23. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013).
24. See id.
25. Smith, supra note 12, at 290.
26. See id. at 282 (quoting David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1
(Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., 1995)).
27. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1197–98 (2002).
28. Id. at 1198.
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particular time in order to protect the extra-contractual expectations of
essential non-shareholder groups, as well.
The idea of shareholder primacy began to emerge in the nineteenth
century. It grew in popularity during the 1930s, became widely accepted
by the 1990s, and is considered, for the most part, the norm today.29 The
development of derivative litigation in the nineteenth century was an
early indication that directors should operate the corporation in the
interest of the shareholders.30 For example, in Gray v. President of
Portland Bank,31 Justice Samuel Sewall reasoned that the firm was the
trustee of the shareholders, and therefore, it could not act except for the
benefit of existing shareholders, thus supporting the notion that
shareholders were the sole beneficiaries of the firm.32 In Robinson v.
Smith,33 a shareholder brought a suit against the firm because the
company failed to pursue mining operations, which was the purpose for
which it was incorporated, and subsequently the firm incurred a
substantial loss.34 The court found in favor of the shareholder and
reasoned that directors willfully abused their duty of trust to the
shareholders.35

29. In a highly publicized statement issued in August 2019, the Business
Roundtable announced that the purpose of the corporation should be to benefit all
stakeholders, not just shareholders. See Press Release, Business Roundtable Redefines
the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “An Economy That Serves All Americans”
(August 19, 2019) (on file with author), https://www.businessroundtable.org/businessroundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-servesall-americans [https://perma.cc/599K-2P9L]. This statement, signed by 181 prominent
CEOs, marked a stark departure from prior positions of the Business Roundtable, which
previously had championed shareholder primacy. Id. Whether this shift in attitude will
make a difference in board decision-making has been questioned. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155. The authors argue that
corporate managers in states that had other-constituency statutes did not tend to protect
non-shareholder constituencies in acquisitions but rather obtained gains for
shareholders and themselves. Id.
30. Smith, supra note 12, at 304.
31. 3 Mass. 364 (1807).
32. Id. at 378–79; see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy,
Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE UNIV.
L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2013).
33. 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
34. Id. at 223; accord Smith, supra note 12, at 308.
35. Smith, supra note 12, at 308 (quoting Robinson, 3 Paige Ch. at 222–23).
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Because of the foundation laid by these cases, shareholder primacy
theory began to gain universal acceptance. In 1919, the court in Dodge
v. Ford Motor Company36 endorsed the shareholder primacy norm
explicitly by stating that “a business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”37 The idea that directors
should act in the interests of the shareholders follows almost logically
from state corporate statutes, which delegate to shareholders (and only
to shareholders) the power to elect directors.38 Following the Dodge
ruling, public companies began to solidify the idea of shareholder
primacy in their corporate charters.39
In general, and building on this legal history, four groups helped
propel the shareholder primacy theory into the central theory in
corporate governance. First, academics seeking to answer the question
“what is the purpose of the corporation,” saw shareholder primacy as a
logical answer.40 Second, “activist” investors, who, for instance, urged a
corporation’s board to increase dividends or spinout unprofitable
divisions or subsidiaries, helped create a culture in which shareholder
primacy became the norm.41 Indeed, these activist investors explicitly or

36.
37.
38.

170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
Id. at 684.
Leo Strine, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and a
leading scholar on corporate law, has repeatedly made the argument that corporate
power is corporate purpose, meaning that because shareholders wield ultimate power
within the corporation, the directors must (and do) operate the corporation to best serve
them. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An
Encouragement for Future Consideration From Professors Johnson and Millon, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 1166–68 (2017); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing
Struggle With the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 135, 136 (2012); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a ClearEyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015).
Justice Strine does not argue that directors should ignore the interests of corporate
constituencies counter to shareholders’ interests, but instead argues that current law–by
structure and design–precludes them from doing so and, in his experience, effectively
so. See id.
39. Stout, supra note 27, at 1180.
40. Id. at 1174.
41. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism:
Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV.
19–20 (2016) (explaining how activist investors have used the leverage of large
shareholdings and appraisal litigation to discipline corporate management.
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implicitly threatened the tenure of corporate managers who failed to
prioritize shareholder wealth. Third, policy entrepreneurs such as
academics and business consultants, argued that to improve corporate
governance, boards of directors must embrace shareholder primacy as
the norm. Prominent among these academics was Milton Friedman, who
argued in a widely read New York Times essay that the only purpose of
a corporation was the pursuit of profit, a basic tenet of the shareholder
primacy norm.42 Fourth, CEOs and executives accepted shareholder
primacy because it suggested that the obvious metric to determine the
value of the corporation should be stock price, and stock price turned
out to be something that was relatively easy for executives to
manipulate, at least in the short run.43
By the early 1990s, shareholder primacy was a widely accepted
theory, and, in a sense, was enshrined in the Internal Revenue Code in a
1993 provision.44 Responding to popular concerns that executive
compensation was excessive, Congress amended the tax code to limit
the deductibility of executive compensation to $1,000,000 unless the
excess compensation was performance-based.45 To comply with this
requirement, corporations typically granted executives qualified stock
options, which were only valuable to the recipient if the stock price rose.
Incentivizing corporate actors to maximize share price, of course, is
consonant with the idea of shareholder primacy.
B. STAKEHOLDER THEORY
A growing body of scholarship promotes the idea that in decisionmaking, corporate directors should take into account the effect of their
actions on the corporation’s stakeholders. This includes, at the least, the
corporation’s employees, creditors, suppliers, and the communities in
which the corporation has facilities, in addition to the corporation’s
shareholders. Stakeholder theory is thus in profound conflict with the
idea of shareholder primacy.

Interestingly, the article accepts, without discussion, that the goal of the corporation is
to maximize shareholder returns).
42. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
43. Stout, supra note 27, at 1176.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m).
45. In 2017, § 162(m) was amended to remove the exception for performancebased pay. Id.
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Advocated for many years, stakeholder theory is of great interest,
especially in the current sociopolitical climate. One of the leading
theorists, Professor R. Edward Freeman, has written extensively on the
topic.46 In STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH,47
Freeman identifies the various stakeholders of a firm, which he defines
generally as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by,
the achievement of a corporation’s purpose. Stakeholders include
employees,
customers,
suppliers,
stockholders,
banks,
environmentalists, government and other groups who can help or hurt
the corporation.”48 The crux of his thesis is that corporations have not
been managed with a view toward dealing with each of these
stakeholders, and effective management requires that they do so.49 In
other words, the emphasis appears to be on increasing the corporation’s
long-term success. He argues that “if business organizations are to be
successful in the current and future environment . . . executives must
take multiple stakeholder groups into account.”50 Freeman’s argument
for a stakeholder philosophy starts from the presumption that
globalization, increased competition, and other factors have increased
the challenges facing corporate management; he argues that a
stakeholder approach is the best way to successfully navigate these
changes. But the idea that corporate management has not understood the
importance of, for instance, maintaining a loyal workforce or supplier
network to effectively compete in a global market seems, on its face,
implausible.
Further, Freeman seeks to distinguish his approach to corporate
management from the corporate social responsibility movement. He
argues that advocates of the latter do not fully appreciate the importance
of integrating social responsibility with managers’ strategic thinking:
“corporate social responsibility literature . . . has failed to indicate ways
46. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, J.S. HARRISON, A.C. WICKS, ET. AL.,
STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART (2010); STAKEHOLDERS (R. Edward
Freeman & Robert A. Phillips, eds., 2010); Jacob Hörisch, R. Edward Freeman, and
Stefan Schaltegger, Applying Stakeholder Theory in Sustainability Management: Links,
Similarities, Dissimilarities, and a Conceptual Framework, 27 ORGS. & ENV’T 4 (May
27, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026614535786.
47. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
48. Id. at vi.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 52.
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of integrating these concerns into the strategic systems of the
corporation in a non-ad hoc fashion.”51 In other words, corporate social
responsibility is only one aspect of the many internal and external
challenges that managers face. Freeman concedes that dealing with
outside stakeholders is voluntary,52 but describes how negotiating with,
say, a consumer group, is better than a “hardball” tactic of nonnegotiating.53 It appears that in the 30 years since Freeman published
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, no distinction is currently recognized
between those advocating greater corporate social responsibility and
proponents of a stakeholder theory of corporate management.
In any case, unlike shareholder primacy, which has a well-accepted
definition, the parameters of stakeholder theory vary from proponent to
proponent. Some advocates for stakeholder theory argue that directors
should consider all individuals and groups that are affected by corporate
actions.54 At its extreme, of course, the affected stakeholders are without
limit under such a definition. A corporation that, for instance,
manufactures airplanes and buys engines from an engine manufacturer
has an effect on that supplier and its stakeholders, as well as on every
company in the engine manufacturer’s supply chain and their respective
stakeholders. Weighing the effects of its decisions on such a large and
far-flung supply chain may be a nearly impossible task. Stakeholder
theorists readily suggest such an obligation but do not grapple with its
practical implications.55
In addition to a diversity of views on who should be considered a
stakeholder, stakeholder theorists propose various rationales to justify or
support their theory:
1.
Large corporations affect the lives of a broad range of
individuals and have an outsized influence on the economy and the
public interest.56

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 75–76.
Keay, supra note 4, at 256–57.
Spencer J. Hazan, Note, Considering Stakeholders in M&A, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 749, 755 (2020).
56. See, e.g., ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 7 (Hart Publ’g
Ltd. 2015).
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2.
Outside groups, in addition to shareholders, contribute to a
corporation’s capital and, therefore, “should have claims on a
corporation’s assets and earnings.”57
3.
Considering the various constituencies that contribute to a
corporation’s profitability benefits the corporation because these
constituencies will be more loyal to the corporation.58
4.
Because many groups and individuals who deal with or are
affected by a corporation do not have explicit contracts, there is an
implicit understanding that their interests will be considered by
corporate decision makers.59
5.
Stakeholder protection is a matter of recognizing the
human rights of those stakeholders.60

However, none of these rationales are persuasive upon further
interrogation. The following considers each in turn.
1. The Outsized Effect of Corporations
Assuming the truth of the assertion that corporate policy has an
outsized effect on individuals and the economy, it does not necessarily
follow that the corporation has to consider each stakeholder in its
decision making. To the extent that stakeholders are individuals, they
have political processes available to them to affect corporate behavior.
If, for instance, the claim is that a corporation should provide paid
parental leave for its employees, it is more efficient for citizens to lobby
their elected officials to change the law than for employees of multiple
corporations to lobby their employers for a new benefit. Such a law
would presumably not disadvantage one employer over others, while a
piecemeal approach to the problem would. Moreover, the interests of
stakeholders often conflict; what benefits consumers, for instance lower

57. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1171 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 4, at 265; see also John Plender, Giving People a
Stake in the Future, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN. 211, 215 (1998).
59. See, e.g., Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A
Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 589, 622 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Robert Phillips, R. Edward Freeman & Andrew C. Wicks, What
Stakeholder Theory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479, 494 (2003).
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prices, adversely affects other stakeholders, such as shareholders and
employees. A policy that benefits suppliers, for instance higher prices
for inputs, disadvantages other stakeholders, such as consumers. There
is no principled way to weigh these competing interests, and resolving
them in any way other than what maximizes profits will adversely affect
the corporation’s ability to compete, which in the end disadvantages all
stakeholders.
2. Contribution of Capital by Stakeholders
This claim about non-shareholders is specious at best. In relation to
a corporation, “capital” is normally thought of as financial assets,
tangible machinery, and equipment employed to produce goods and
services.61 In her article Implications of the Stakeholder Model,
Professor Roberta Karmel notes that employees make a “financial
contribution to the corporation . . . in the form of human capital”62 and
that communities provide capital in the form of “governmental services
to the business and its employees.”63 Professor Karmel recognizes the
shortcomings of this approach, writing, “it is difficult to weave any
theory as to how [customers and suppliers] supply a corporation with
capital unless they are providers of trade credit.”64 This observation
reveals that the argument reduces to a rhetorical device and, like the
“outsized effect” claim, cannot support its conclusion. Instead of
providing capital, various stakeholders provide goods and services that
the corporation needs to utilize the capital supplied by its equity and
debt investors. In addition, many proponents of stakeholder theory
would include the “environment” as a stakeholder.65 Arguing that the
environment provides capital is, of course, absurd. Individuals and
entities that transact business with the corporation do so on terms that
are agreeable to the parties. There is no reason to characterize the
consideration provided by each of the corporation’s counterparties as
“capital.” To do so would drain the term “capital” of any meaning.
61. Marshall
Hargrave, Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (March 26, 2020),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital.asp [https://perma.cc/BLN2-W7LW]. In
order to qualify as capital, the goods must provide an ongoing service to the business to
create wealth. See id.
62. Karmel, supra note 51, at 1171.
63. Id. at 1171–72.
64. Id. at 1172.
65. Keay, supra note 4, at 271.
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3. The Corporation Benefits From Protecting Stakeholders
This is perhaps the weakest argument, because it is not a rationale
at all. If a corporation would realize enhanced returns because, for
instance, it weighed the effect of its employment policies on the
productivity and loyalty of its work force, then it would do so under a
profit maximization philosophy, and stakeholder theory would become
redundant. There is also a paternalistic undertone to this argument,
suggesting that corporate decision makers are not fully capable of
determining what policies are most profitable. Further, and worse yet,
the critics outside the corporation are more capable than the corporate
managers. For example, some corporations provide on-site daycare for
children of their employees. They do so not because the relevant
decision makers are “good folks” who have their employees’ best
interests at heart, but rather because the policy enhances employee
productivity and recruitment. For other employers, however, the
increase in productivity would not justify the added expense, and
recruitment is not a problem. If an employer were to provide a benefit
and its competitors did not, that employer might be at a competitive
disadvantage which, in turn, could adversely affect the very employees
in question.
4. Implicit Understanding
It is inevitable, of course, that in making decisions, corporate actors
consider the effect of their decisions on stakeholders that are most
directly affected by those decisions. Deciding how to price the
corporation’s goods or services requires a predictive analysis of
consumer response. For example, deciding whether to declare additional
paid holidays for employees is often motivated by a belief that
employees will respond favorably. Moreover, for each decision,
directors must (and inevitably do) consider the effect on the firm’s
bottom line. So, at one level, the “implicit understanding” rationale does
not support an argument that stakeholder theory is different from
principles of traditional corporate governance. This rationale may have
force, however, if the corporate decision makers are expected to
consider the effect of their decisions on stakeholders who are indirectly
affected. For instance, using the example from above, if a corporation is
considering providing a free daycare facility on its premises for children
of its employees, should (or must) the board consider the effect on
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daycare providers in the community? Posing the question suggests two
additional questions: How would they weigh the interests of the
community daycare providers? And what is the source of the implicit
agreement upon which the outside daycare providers rely under this
rationale?
As to how the interest of the outside providers would be weighed,
the answer is that there is no principled way to do so. Indeed, in terms of
time, it is hard to justify the cost of making the attempt. And, as to the
source of the implicit understanding, there is none. Basic contract
doctrine suggests that an “implied” contract between two parties exists
under two circumstances. The first is when the facts suggest that both
parties intended that there be an agreement,66 and the second is when,
for various policy reasons, the law imposes a contractual (or quasicontractual) obligation on a person.67 The former arises when the words
and actions of the parties support the inference that they intended to be
bound to one another, although an explicit understanding is lacking. The
latter relates to situations in which one party enriched another party and
a court determines that it would be unjust if the benefited party did not
compensate the benefit provider.68 Neither circumstance is implicated in
this rationale for the stakeholder theory.
5. Human Rights
The argument that the failure to consider the interest of a
stakeholder violates the human rights of that stakeholder69 is simply an
argument by assertion. Rights do not emerge from thin air; they must
have a basis in law, whether statutory, constitutional, or, at the least,
natural law. That corporate stakeholders have a human right in relation

66. Will Kenton, Implied Contract, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/implied_contract.asp
[https://perma.cc/PK8KBJV3] (“An implied contract is a legally-binding obligation that derives from actions,
conduct, or circumstances of one or more parties in an agreement.”).
67. Will Kenton, Quasi Contract, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quasi-contract.asp
[https://perma.cc/SGX4DGRL] (“It is created by a judge to correct a circumstance in which one party acquires
something at the expense of the other. The contract aims to prevent one party from
unfairly benefiting from the situation at the other party’s expense.”).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM.
L. INST. 2011).
69. Keay, supra note 4, at 268.
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to a corporation is a statement that is creative but lacking in explanatory
power.
In short, there is no persuasive rationale supporting the theory that
directors (and, indeed, other corporate actors) should consider the
interests of all stakeholders when making business decisions. Moreover,
as indicated above, the requirement they do so is without adequate
guidance. Essentially, any such decision would not be subject to a
meaningful review, and the decision makers would be unaccountable.
By contrast, the theory of shareholder primacy is relatively easy to
articulate and is easy for decision makers to implement. As a result,
decision makers can be (and often are) held accountable.70
While stakeholder theory seems to lack a convincing rationale, its
popularity may already be affecting corporate behavior. Professor Lisa
Fairfax, in her article The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, suggests that stakeholder
theory is shaping the way directors behave, a view shared by other
theorists.71 She concludes:
In contrast to those who discount this shift, this Article argues that
the rhetorical embrace of stakeholder rhetoric has important
normative repercussions. Focusing on the intrinsic value of rhetoric
as a persuasive and expressive device, this Article argues that such
rhetoric reveals normative dissatisfaction with shareholder primacy
that extends to both customers and employees as well as the business
community and investors. Even if temporary, the rhetoric reveals
some societal and investor discontent with the prevailing shareholder
primacy principle.72

Even conceding, however, that the rhetoric is a “persuasive and
expressive device,” it is unclear that corporate actors have embraced
stakeholder balancing as a norm of behavior.73 Many instances which
Fairfax cites as evidence would be far more persuasive if the corporation
in question had proposed an amendment to its articles, embraced a
70. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2020 WL
425965, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020).
71. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 678 (2006).
72. Id. at 712.
73. Cf. id. at 690–98 (citing stakeholder rhetoric in corporate annual reports, codes
of conduct, and business school curricula, as well as the creation of internal compliance
and ethics infrastructures, as evidence of a normative shift).
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stakeholder theory, or, better still, re-incorporated in a jurisdiction with
an other-constituency statute. In other words, if a board of directors
were committed to a stakeholder approach, its commitment would be
more persuasive if the board disclosed its intentions in ways that the law
readily affords.
If investors preferred a stakeholder philosophy, and, if boards of
directors were operating under such a philosophy, we would expect
boards to propose amendments to the articles of incorporation or bylaws
that welcome shareholder proposals that further stakeholder concerns.
That does not appear to be the case. Shareholders frequently present
environmental and social proposals to be voted upon at the annual
shareholders meeting pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8.74 As a general matter,
the number of such proposals increases each year.75 In 2017, for
instance, shareholders submitted some 345 proposals related to
environmental and social issues to public companies for presentation at
shareholder meetings, which amounted to 56% of all shareholder
proposals.76 Also, in 2017, environmentally-related proposals had
overall shareholder support of 20%. Proposals typically supported by
known proxy advisory firms averaged between 23% and 42%
shareholder support, while “other” proposals typically received 20% or
less shareholder support.77 Moreover, other companies, primarily in the
technology and financial services sectors, have filed shareholder

74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011); see also Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship:
Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. 983,
1027 (2020).
75. Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire H. Holland, Corporate
Governance: United States, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 252, 268 (2019); A Look at
Governance Shareholder Proposals in 2015, INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. (2020),
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/a-look-at-governance-shareholder-proposals-in2015/ [https://perma.cc/RJ9B-B6NC].
76. Becky L. Jacobs, Milton Friedman Has a Lot to Answer for: A Response to
Joshua Fershee’s “Long Live Director Primacy: Social Benefit Entities and the
Downfall of Social Responsibility,” 19 TRANSACTIONS 391, 400 (2017) (citing Ronald
O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017
Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developmentsduring-the-2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/346F-C6BM]).
77. James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Climate-Change Proposals Break
Through, PROXY MONITOR (2017), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017Finding1
.aspx [https://perma.cc/3AZ7-BER6]. Such “other” proposals included those seeking
the appointment of independent directors with environmental expertise or linking
executive compensation to sustainability metrics. See id.
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proposals in recent years to close identified gender pay gaps.78 Thus, the
empirical evidence suggests that boards are not embracing an easy way
to integrate stakeholder philosophy in their governance structure.79
C. THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY
In A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,80 Professors
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue for a team approach to corporate
law; that is, the board of directors acts as a mediating institution that
must divide profits among all who provide capital to the corporation.
The division includes not only shareholders, but also employees, who
provide human capital, managers, and others. This is thus a modified
stakeholder theory, and purports to be both normative and descriptive.
Their theory is that team production keeps shareholders and others from
using firm-specific assets opportunistically. In their words:
[B]y putting control over the firm’s assets and outputs in the hands
of the board (whose members are precluded by law from using that
control for their own personal benefit), corporate law prevents
shareholders, managers, and other team members from using such
control to opportunistically expropriate rents from the team.81

The team production concept is that all of these parties who
contribute “capital” do so on the implicit understanding that their

78.
79.

Gregory, Grapsas & Holland, supra note 75, at 269.
In Social Responsibility Resolutions, Scott Hirst argues that the low numbers of
favorable votes for social responsibility resolutions may be distorted because of the
voting by mutual funds, which own, in the aggregate, about 24% of the equity in U.S.
corporations. 43 UNIV. IOWA J. CORP. L. 217, 220 (2018). Hirst suggests that polling
data indicates that, on some issues (principally resolutions relating to disclosure of
corporate political spending and shareholder approval of proposed political spending),
investor preferences are not consistent with voting by those funds. Id. at 230. Funds are
likely to vote against those resolutions, but if given the choice, investors would favor
them. Id. As Hirst concedes, the polling data is somewhat suspect and, of course,
mutual funds presumably vote their shares in the way that they believe is in the best
interests of their investors. Id. at 233–34.
80. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 315–16 (1999).
81. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 746 (1999).
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contribution will be managed by the board of directors not only in the
shareholders’ interests, but in theirs as well.82
This notion–really an assumption–of an “implicit understanding” is
convenient indeed, but lacking as a matter of fact and law. As a simple
example, do managers, who have explicit contracts with the corporation,
also have an implicit understanding that the board will manage the
corporation in their interests, at least to some extent? What would be the
basis for their understanding? However, even conceding that point, the
authors lack a rubric for how the corporate profits would be divided.
The authors suggest that “the returns to any particular corporate
stakeholder from participating in the corporation will be determined not
only by market forces, but by political forces.”83 This process is largely
one of negotiation by the relevant stakeholder.
Interestingly, the authors note the share of corporate returns going
to shareholders has increased (in the period before the publication of
their article) and attribute this to market forces: To attract capital,
shareholder returns had to increase and, at the same time, technological
advances and lower rates of unionization weakened the hand of labor.
We believe it is fair to say that both before and after the appearance of
this article, management decisions were heavily influenced by market
forces. Team production merely describes management’s need to
respond to market forces with respect to each input of production. Blair
and Stout conclude their article with the observation that boards as
82. Professor Stout has written extensively and critically about the shareholder
primacy norm. She is of the view that there is no justification in law or economics to
justify the norm. See Lynn A. Stout, The Dumbest Business Idea Ever. The Myth of
Maximizing Shareholder Value, EVONOMICS (Mar. 15, 2016), http://evonomics.com/
maximizing-shareholder-value-dumbest-idea/ [https://perma.cc/VCS7-7NH7]. Stout
argues that corporate actors should satisfice:
Satisficing has many advantages as a corporate decision-making strategy. Most
obviously, it does not try to resolve conflicts among different shareholders by
maximizing only the interests of the small subset who are most short-term,
opportunistic, undiversified, and asocial. It allows managers instead to try to
decently (but not perfectly) serve the interests of many different shareholders–
including long-term shareholders; shareholders who want the company to be able
to keep commitments to customers and employees; diversified shareholders who
want to avoid damaging their other interests as investors, employees, and
consumers; and prosocial shareholders who want the company to earn profits in a
socially and environmentally responsible fashion.

Id.; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
667, 680–86 (2003).
83. See Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 325 (emphasis added).
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mediating hierarchies explains corporate law, but that the increasing
rhetoric about shareholder primacy poses the threat that the law may
change to enhance shareholder primacy, and that would be a bad thing.84
With that, the article is both descriptive and normative.
While it is true that (some) employees make firm-specific
investments of human capital in the firm, many do not, or the value of
their human capital investment is limited. Some employees who do
make significant investments of human capital in the firm could possibly
be in a position to contract for these investments. Shareholders are
always residual claimants, dependent on management’s good faith for a
return on their investment.
Thus, one major problem with the theory is to determine when to
treat employees as “investors,” and when to treat them as being
adequately protected and compensated for their investment. For an
extreme example, think about a CEO with a munificent contract; is she
entitled to more? What about a software engineer with stock options? At
the other extreme, how entitled are unskilled or semi-skilled factory
workers? Why wouldn’t corporate management compensate them for
their contributions so as to encourage their productivity and loyalty,
given that such outcomes are best for the profitability of the firm? If
management fails to do so, it is acting inconsistently with its traditional
fiduciary duties and can be held accountable on that basis. As to making
that judgment, the courts have traditionally deferred to the board of
directors under the umbrella of the business judgment rule.85
Blair & Stout cite several well-known corporate law cases as proof
that the team production model describes the current state of corporate
law.86 We do not believe that the team production model is an accurate

84.
85.

Id. at 326–27.
See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Ent. Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999).
The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
Where, as here, there is no claim that enhanced judicial scrutiny is required
because of the nature of the transaction, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff
must allege well pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.”
The presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases
where the decision under attack is “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad
faith.”

Id. (citations omitted).
86. See Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 301–304.
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description of corporate governance. For instance, after distinguishing
Dodge, discussed above, as essentially a dispute between shareholders,
Blair & Stout cite Shlensky v. Wrigley,87 Credit Lyonnaise Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,88 Cheff v. Mathes,89
and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.90 as examples of
courts endorsing the role of boards as mediators among corporate
constituencies (thereby rejecting shareholder primacy theory). While
there is some support for that conclusion, when read objectively, the
cases do not go nearly that far.
In Shlensky, the court sided with the directors of the Chicago
National League Ball Club Inc., a Delaware corporation that owned and
operated the Chicago Cubs.91 The plaintiff challenged the directors to
install lights and schedule night games, with a goal of increasing the
profitability of the corporation.92 The board refused, citing the adverse
effect that night games would have on the neighborhood surrounding the
ballpark.93 The court sided with the directors in this derivative action,
but Blair & Stout argued that the board was mediating between the
shareholders and the residents in the community, who did not want night
games in their neighborhood.94 However, the court seemed to be
persuaded by–or at least was unwilling to second guess–the directors’
argument that the corporation was better off, in the long run, if the
neighborhood remained stable and safe, which might not be the case if
night games were regularly played there.95 Shlensky is thus a classic
example of a court deferring to the business judgment of an unconflicted
board. To suggest that the board forwent a more profitable course of
action merely to accommodate the community is just speculation and
requires one to believe that the court was being dishonest when it wrote:
“we are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Phillip K. Wrigley [the
controlling shareholder], and through him to the other directors, are
contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the stockholders.”96

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 781.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 303.
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
Id.
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Credit Lyonnaise, a second case cited by Blair & Stout, is even less
helpful to their thesis. The Chancery Court opinion in Credit Lyonnaise
included a footnote suggesting that when a corporation enters the zone
of insolvency, the board of directors should consider the interests of
creditors, not just shareholders.97 Though clearly intended as a dictum,
this notion is arguably consistent with Blair & Stout’s thesis. But the
Credit Lyonnaise dictum was rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court
in its 2007 North American Catholic Education Programming
Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla decision: “Recognizing that directors of
an insolvent corporation owe direct fiduciary duties to creditors would
create uncertainty for directors who have a fiduciary duty to exercise
their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent
corporation.”98
Blair & Stout also offer Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc. as an example of a Delaware court rejecting shareholder primacy.99
The Delaware Supreme Court deferred to the Time board, which had
rejected Paramount’s generous offer for Time stock if Time would
abandon a planned merger with Warner.100 However, to the extent that
this case is contrary to the theory of shareholder primacy (which is itself
highly questionable), it has been recognized as an outlier in the
Delaware jurisprudence attributable to its somewhat unique facts.101 In
addition, subsequent Delaware cases can only be understood as
reflecting shareholder primacy.102 And, importantly, the Paramount v.
Time court did not indicate it was overruling its earlier decision in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.103 or the definitive
language in Revlon affirming shareholder primacy: “A board may have
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the

97. Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. Civ. A.
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
98. 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (internal punctuation omitted).
99. Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 309.
100. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
101. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–47
(Del. 1994) (distinguishing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. on its facts).
102. See id.; see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928
(Del. 2003); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266
(Del. Ch. 1993).
103. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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stockholders.”104 Blair & Stout seek to distinguish Revlon and its
statement of shareholder primacy:
On first inspection, this language appears to support shareholder
primacy. Closer analysis suggests, however, that Revlon may in fact
support the mediating hierarchy model. Although the Revlon opinion
did not clarify what it meant to say that a company’s “break-up” was
“inevitable,” in subsequent cases Revlon has been interpreted to
apply “[w]hen a majority of a corporation’s voting shares are [to be]
acquired by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting
together.” In other words, Revlon applies when a formerly publicly
held corporation is about to become essentially a privately held firm.
As noted earlier, in closely held firms subject to the control of a
single shareholder or group of shareholders, directors enjoy
relatively little independence and can no longer function effectively
as mediating hierarchs. Thus the Revlon exception to the general rule
may reflect an intuitive judicial recognition that when a firm “goes
private,” it abandons the mediating hierarchy approach in favor of a
grand-design principal-agent structure dominated by a controlling
shareholder.105

Blair & Stout’s reading of Revlon is plausible, but forced, because
Revlon applies not only when a firm goes private, but also when it is to
be liquidated.106 Blair & Stout essentially argue that the Delaware courts
should not be taken at their word, but we see no reason not to do so.
Those unconvinced by this analysis need look no further than the recent
observations of the erstwhile Chief Justice of Delaware Supreme Court,
Leo E. Strine, Jr., who dismissed the idea that courts, or at least the
Delaware courts, do not mean what they say.107
II. THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF DIRECTORS
Since stakeholder theorists seek to reorient the decisional priorities
of corporate directors, they might be satisfied with a norm that director
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 182.
Blair & Stout, supra note 80, at 309.
The Delaware Supreme Court made this clear in Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc.: “Accordingly, when a corporation undertakes a transaction which
will cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or (b) a break-up of the corporate entity,
the directors’ obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders.” 637 A.2d at 48.
107. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My
Hometown 4 (Univ. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 16-34, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906875.
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actions should be informed by moral principles. What appears to be
objectionable to stakeholder theorists about the shareholder primacy
norm is that it has overtones of avarice and greed, and causes harm to
third parties—clearly immoral impulses. Under this analysis, directors
who are free to act morally will naturally consider the effect of their
actions on the corporation’s various stakeholders.
While stakeholder theorists typically do not cite such principles to
support their theory, a broad concept of morality could support a norm
that corporate directors must consider the effect of their actions on
remote individuals and entities that do not have a direct stake in the
corporation. Moreover, and aside from the views of stakeholder
theorists, a norm that supports or requires that directors act ethically
seems unassailable. However, such a norm is not easily operationalized,
and thus not a viable legal alternative to shareholder primacy.108
Nearly all theories governing what actions are morally permissible
fall into one of three families—consequentialism, deontology, or virtue
ethics. To illustrate the problems with charging corporate directors and
managers to simply act morally as an alternative to shareholder primacy,
we need only discuss the first of these families of theories in significant
detail. According to consequentialism, an action is right if and only if it
produces the right consequences.109 Consequentialist theories differ
depending on which consequences are deemed relevant and what counts
as a right configuration of consequences. One such theory, Act
Utilitarianism, is most frequently interpreted as requiring that an action
maximize utility.110 “Utility” in this context typically denotes whatever
108. A note on terminology: The terms “ethics” and “morals” are sometimes
understood to involve slightly different shades of meaning. For our purposes here, we
will consider them interchangeable, although we will generally use “moral” and its
variants throughout.
109. Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil., Consequentialism (2003) (rev. Jun. 3, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/H9H5-B3QD].
110. Works by major figures in the development of Act Utilitarianism include
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (Doubleday 1961) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger
Crisp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1861); and HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS
OF ETHICS (London, Macmillan & Co. 1874). See generally Jeremy Bentham,
Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL
TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in
THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876);
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, in THE MAKING OF MODERN LAW: LEGAL
TREATISES, 1800-1926 (Clarendon Press, 1876).
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value makes people’s lives better. Most Utilitarians are also Hedonists,
meaning that they consider happiness to be the only thing that ultimately
makes life better; or conversely worse, in the case of unhappiness. The
most common articulation of Act Utilitarianism directs us to act in such
a way that we create the greatest net balance of happiness over
unhappiness. If Act Utilitarianism is interpreted as being concerned with
expected happiness instead of actual happiness, then morally right
actions will only be those that we have good reason to believe will
create the greatest probability-weighted happiness.
Suppose a director believes that there is a 50% chance that the
economy will slip into a recession in the next quarter. If it does, then
pursuing a certain investment will predictably result in losses and,
potentially, company-wide layoffs. In turn, this would create a
significant net loss of happiness. Suppose on the other hand that the
economy does not slip into a recession. Then, the same investment
would result in higher profits and bonuses for a small number of
employees, and no lay-offs, in turn, creating a slight net gain of
happiness. Given that the probability assigned to the recession occurring
is 50%, the utility-maximizing action would be to abstain from the
investment. However, in a different probability distribution where the
recession was extremely unlikely, pursuing the investment could be the
utility-maximizing action.
Other consequentialist theories differ from Act Utilitarianism. As
previously mentioned, one would countenance a different outcome by
employing different consequences that matter morally other than
happiness, or by using a decision rule other than maximization to
determine the right consequences. For example, perhaps there are
multiple good consequences that should be considered rather than only
happiness, such as aesthetic value, truth, freedom, and so forth. Or
perhaps rather than maximizing good consequences, it is enough to
reach some minimally-adequate threshold of good consequences. Most
consequentialists have been less attracted to these alternatives, as they
tend to clutter and confound an otherwise very elegant moral theory that
simply directs people to create the most happiness.
Act Utilitarianism applied straightforwardly to the world of
corporate decision-making would have some surprising implications.
For example, a corporate director attempting to maximize utility might
decide that dissolving the corporation would create the greatest balance
of happiness over unhappiness in the world. After all, according to Act
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Utilitarianism, no one’s happiness receives higher priority than anyone
else’s.111 While shareholders might be very unhappy with the directors’
decision, their happiness would count for no more than the happiness of,
say, a worker somewhere in the corporation’s global supply chain, an
asthmatic person living in close proximity to air pollution generated by
the corporation, or even a future person who is impacted by changes in
the global climate for which the corporation is partly responsible.
Furthermore, there is a built-in restraint of sorts in Act
Utilitarianism against extreme pursuit of profit because money has
diminishing marginal utility. Each additional dollar gained increases
one’s happiness less than the previous dollar; $1,000 means much more
to one living in poverty than to a millionaire. For this reason, increasing
shareholder value when shareholders are already likely among the
wealthier members of society is unlikely to be a utility-maximizing
action. It would seem far better to redistribute those resources, at least in
the short-term, to those for whom money has a higher value.
Nevertheless, there are theorists who view Act Utilitarianism as
consistent with the pursuit of profit and who even offer Act Utilitarian
theories of corporate governance.112 Taking the long-run view, and
paired with certain liberal views about the value of markets, pursuing
profit can potentially be seen as utility maximizing. The current historic
lows in global poverty are plausibly attributable to market liberalization
in the developing world and the kind of Pareto improvements that
market interactions enable.113 Without the profit motive, these
improvements would not have occurred. So, although individual market
transactions might not seem to maximize utility, a market-based system
in the aggregate plausibly does. Or, at least it seems to produce greater
net happiness than any other alternative. If good results are only possible
by allowing or encouraging the pursuit of profit, then a view like
shareholder primacy might be given a consequentialist (or Act
Utilitarian in particular) moral grounding.

111. This feature of Act Utilitarianism is most famously attributed to Bentham as his
dictum “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one.” See MILL, supra note
110, at 53.
112. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 239 (2002).
113. Not Always with Us, THE ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013), https://www.
economist.com/briefing/2013/06/01/not-always-with-us [https://perma.cc/4M3V-RE8M].
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This is the view taken by Professors Hansmann and Kraakman in a
2001 law review article arguing for shareholder primacy.114 But the
underlying consequentialist framework is open to different
interpretations. One might also construct a stakeholder view out of
consequentialist considerations. If “stakeholder” is interpreted broadly
enough to include everyone (and everything) whose interests are
potentially affected by the firm, then maximizing stakeholder interests
amounts to the same thing as maximizing utility. Finally, Joseph Heath’s
market failures approach (discussed below) could also be grounded in
consequentialism.115 Taking the same idea that only well-functioning
markets tend to maximize utility, Heath’s approach could be viewed as a
check on pursuing profits that coheres neatly with the general directive
to maximize utility.
This leads to the first major problem with directing corporate
directors and managers to simply act morally: moral theories do not
often precisely apply themselves to the kinds of decisions directors face.
As a result, they underdetermine which actions are morally permissible.
Because of this, there is no way to legally operationalize a directive to
simply act morally. Imagine there was broad agreement that Act
Utilitarianism is the one true moral theory. Even if we say, “act morally,
by which we mean maximize utility,” this directive has been variously
interpreted as implying everything from the wrongfulness of pursuing
profit to the moral requirement to pursue profit. One corporate director
might interpret “maximizing utility” to mean that the corporation should
be dissolved, and another may understand it to mean that shareholder
profit ought to be maximized. There simply is no useful guidance here at
the generalized level of Act Utilitarianism, let alone at the even more
generalized level of “act morally.”
This leads to the second major problem with directing corporate
directors to act morally: There is no consensus on which moral theory,
or family of moral theories, is the correct one. Interpretations of Act
Utilitarianism vary widely, but this is only one of many different moral
theories, belonging to the family of consequentialism. If we turn to
consequentialism’s main rival family, deontology, we find a myriad of

114. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001). This article illustrates the consequentialist moral
theory through profit-maximizing shareholders by providing examples in the way of the
“case of controlling shareholders (‘controllers’) who wish to maximize their financial
returns.” Id. at 460.
115. See infra Part IV.
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other moral theories, each of which face the same problems of
interpretation and application that plagued Act Utilitarianism.116 Here
though, a new problem presents itself. Even if we could agree on an
interpretation and application of a certain theory to the actions of
corporate directors—for example, suppose we agree that according to
Act Utilitarianism, directors ought to maximize profit—why should we
be confident that the theory itself is the correct theory.
Within the deontological family, there is Rights Theory, which
articulates a constellation of rights, both positive (the right to speak
freely) and negative (the right to not to be killed), and explains who
possesses which rights, and in virtue of what, and how rights interact.117
There is also Kantian Ethics, which distills our moral duties ultimately
to what is known as the Categorical Imperative. Perhaps the most
commonly cited formulation of the Categorical Imperative directs us to
respect others by always treating them as ends, and never as mere
means.118 There is also Rossian Pluralism, which directs us to follow a
number of prima facie duties, or standing moral obligations, to which
we should adhere unless they conflict with other prima facie duties.119
There is also Contractualism, which directs us to follow whichever
moral rules would be agreed upon under certain idealized social-contract
conditions.120 And on, and on. Each theory branches, in turn, with
different theorists defending different versions of each.

116. If we move away from simply considering the consequences of actions and
instead take on various deontological concepts like rights, duties, etc., we are no closer
to determining who corporate directors ought to act. Do they have a duty to honor an
implicit promise made to shareholders? (See Friedman, supra note 42.) Or, should they
reduce profitability out of respect for the dignity of each stakeholder? Deontological
theories give us no clearer account than Act Utilitarianism did.
117. For one account, see JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
118. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS 42 (Rev. Henry Calderwood,
LLD., 3rd. ed. 1871). The primary sources of Kant’s ethics are the CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON, and the GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. See
generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill
Abbott, B.D., 4th ed. 1889). Contemporary defenders of Kantian Ethics include
Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood. See CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, CREATING THE
KINGDOM OF ENDS 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). See generally ALLEN WOOD,
KANTIAN ETHICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
119. See W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1930).
120. Perhaps the best known defender of Contractualism is T.M. Scanlon. See
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
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Then, there is the third whole family of moral theories, virtue
ethics, which shifts the moral focus away from actions toward character.
Virtue ethics directs people to exercise phronesis, or a kind of practical
wisdom, as they strive to emulate the virtues of certain moral
exemplars.121 While this is a very abridged and incomplete survey of
theories, it is surely enough to convince the reader of the merits of the
second major problem with asking directors to simply act morally: there
is nothing close to a consensus among moral theorists about what that
would amount to.
Moreover, it does no good to instead appeal to something like
conscience, if by “conscience” we simply mean the direct moral
judgment of directors. In that case, telling directors to act in accordance
with their conscience leads to the same problems as telling them to act
morally. The verdicts of people’s consciences vary as widely as the
verdicts of various moral theories and their interpretations. For example,
a director might be following her conscience when she votes to dissolve
the corporation or when she pursues shareholder profit above all else. If,
on the other hand, “conscience” involves not just a moral judgment, but
something volitional that compels someone to either act or abstain from
acting in a certain way, we believe that the current legal framework
accounts for this. If a director cannot in good conscience maximize
shareholder value for the firm, that director should resign. On the other
hand, if their conscience, or the application of whichever moral theory
they believe to be true, directs them to, say, sabotage or defraud their
corporation, then even if that is in fact morally required, the law cannot
condone such behavior. It may sometimes be the case that one is
morally required to break the law–for example, to effect social change
through civil disobedience, or because one lives under an immoral legal
regime. Perhaps the corporation is engaged in activity so immoral (but
legally protected) that merely resigning from one’s position is morally
insufficient. So be it. Doing the right thing may sometimes require the
courage to face legal, even criminal, repercussions. The law simply
cannot be tailored in such a way that it accommodates each discrete
moral judgment, even if the judgment is correct.
Despite the aforementioned widespread disagreement among moral
theorists, it would be a mistake to conclude that there are no shared
121. Aristotle is the original and most famous virtue ethicist. Contemporary
defenders include Alasdair MacIntyre and Linda Zagzebski. See ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 10 (1985); LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, VIRTUES OF THE MIND 13
(1996).
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judgments among theories. Although Kantian Ethics and Act
Utilitarianism will disagree about why theft is wrong, both theories
agree that it generally is wrong. Where there are such shared judgments,
moral theories can provide a useful and operationalizable framework for
legally prohibiting certain kinds of corporate bad behavior. In fact, if the
theory of shareholder primacy is to have any plausibility as either an
ethical or a legal theory, it must accommodate these minimal moral
restraints. No moral theory would condone maximizing shareholder
value no matter what.122 And neither does the law allow maximizing
shareholder value no matter what. Some corporate actions, though
profitable, are not legal. So, although we think that it is too simplistic to
say that the law ought to encourage directors to behave morally, we do
think that in cases in which there is broad shared moral judgment,
among moral theories or in public sentiment (the collective conscience,
so to speak), that an action which is legal is nevertheless seriously
wrong, this is some indication that a new legal prohibition may be
required. The current legal framework might then be expanded to
address any gaps between that framework and these shared moral
judgments.123
A. THE SHARED MORAL JUDGMENT CONSTRAINT IN PRACTICE
The recurring controversy over prescription drug pricing provides a
useful case in which the existence of a shared moral judgment against a
legal corporate action provided a framework for new regulation.

122. We reject shareholder primacy as an ethical theory for roughly these reasons,
even though we think it is perhaps the best legal framework we have available at
present. As an ethical theory, shareholder primacy would either say that directors have a
moral duty to maximize shareholder value no matter what, or that they have a moral
duty to maximize shareholder value so long as it is morally permissible. The first option
faces obvious counterexamples. The second option is to make shareholder primacy
vacuous as an ethical theory. Why, and under which circumstances, it is morally
permissible to maximize shareholder value is exactly what we would want a moral
theory to tell us, not something to be left as a placeholder. Jason Brennan and others
offer similar criticisms of shareholder primacy as an ethical theory. Jason Brennan,
Review of “Morality Competition and the Firm: The Market Failures Approach to
Business Ethics,” 26 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 3–4 (2016).
123. Or, conversely, the legal framework might need to be attenuated if it prohibits
corporate action about which there is broadly shared moral approval.
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A recent prescription drug controversy, wherein pharmaceutical
companies dramatically raised prices on certain drugs,124 invites the
claim that the corporate actors making these decisions are, at best,
morally callous and, at worst, deeply immoral. While other instances of
bad corporate behavior could be cited, the drug pricing controversy
places the stakeholder philosophy in sharp relief. Mylan Laboratories,
NV, which produced the EpiPen (an auto-injector for epinephrine,
which reverses life-threatening allergic reactions) increased its price by
450%.125 The ensuing controversy demonstrates that Mylan’s decision
makers did not weigh (or weighed inadequately) the effect of the
decision on a core corporate constituency, Mylan’s customers.
Apparently, Mylan determined that a dramatic price increase, while it
may reduce unit sales, would increase Mylan’s profits. So, the decision,
at least nominally, was consistent with the best interests of Mylan’s
shareholders.126
At the same time, the price increase was clearly very adverse to the
interests of Mylan’s customers, and if Mylan had adopted a stakeholder
approach, it would have had to weigh those interests. Setting aside for
now the issues raised with stakeholder theory, the EpiPen price increase
seems to be a significant challenge to shareholder primacy, and hence, at
least initially a point in favor of its rival. At least stakeholder theory has
an explanation of why the EpiPen price increase was objectionable, and
an explanation could ultimately figure into some sort of revision to the
legal framework. If nothing corresponds to this explanation within
shareholder primacy, then shareholder primacy might not be an ideal
underpinning for the relevant legal framework.
There is a mechanism, however, within the existing shareholder
primacy paradigm that could address the EpiPen controversy–the
previously discussed constraint imposed by shared moral judgments. We

124. ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES
PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017)
(“Even after factoring in average discounts of 37 percent in 2015 for the drugs studied,
list prices still increased anywhere from 22 percent to a whopping 442 percent from
2009 to 2015” (citing Robert Langreth, Michael Keller, & Christopher Cannon,
Decoding Big Pharma’s Secret Drug Pricing Practices, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 29, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-drug-prices/
[https://perma.cc/R6NNV63Y])).
125. See id.
126. While it is likely that in the case generally pricing decisions are not made by
the board of directors, the discussion is relevant because the board could intervene or
set a policy that would bind management.
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already accept all kinds of legal checks on maximizing shareholder
value. Companies cannot determine how to dispose of industrial waste,
compensate employees, keep their books, or any number of other actions
solely to maximize profit. The legal constraints already in place are, in
many cases, grounded in common public moral sentiment or the shared
judgment of many moral theories. The public outrage over the EpiPen
controversy should act as a warning for potential modification of the
existing legal paradigm.
Closer examination of the case reveals a couple of unusual features.
First, given the presence of insurance and the ability of insurance
companies to negotiate, was the effective price increase as high as it was
reported? Second, why was it that a manufacturer of the device could
profitably raise the price so much? In other words, to what extent should
we look outside of the corporation for a solution to such a controversy?
The answer to these questions starts with the understanding that
prescription drug pricing takes place in an unusual market.127 First,
many prescription drugs are under active patents, giving the
manufacturer considerable pricing freedom. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that even patented drug prices are often, and significantly,
restrained by pressure from insurers and their affiliated “pharmaceutical
benefit managers.”128 Second, and perhaps more importantly, federal law
prohibits Medicare from negotiating with pharmaceutical companies
over price, which greatly enhances the pricing control of the
manufacturers.129 Were the government able to negotiate over price,
most analysts believe that the effect would be a downward pressure on
prescription drug prices.130 Third, federal law also prohibits the reimportation of prescription drugs.131 Other countries can and do
negotiate with U.S. pharmaceutical companies and are able to secure
prescription drugs at a much lower price than U.S. consumers pay.132 A
127. Feldman, supra note 124, at 19 (“[A] mix of dysfunctional market dynamics,
strong intellectual property protection, and regulation has led to the complicated,
expensive situation we have in the United States.”).
128. Id. at 15–16. In addition, “many pharmaceutical companies provide co-pay
coupons or rebates directly to [consumers],” lowering their direct cost, although the
consumer’s insurer continues to bear the bulk of the cost. Id. at 17.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id.
131. 21 C.F.R. § 203.10 (1999).
132. Feldman, supra note 124, at 5 (“[O]ne drug that costs less than $400 a year in
some countries has a list price around $300,000 in the United States.” (citing Bethany
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more active import market would also place considerable downward
pressure on drug prices.
Fourth, the barriers to entry to manufacture generic replacements
for patented drugs (when the patent expires) are extremely high. The
patent on epinephrine has expired, and the drug can be manufactured
generically. However, the costs and time delays to achieve approval by
the Food and Drug Administration to produce a competitor to the
EpiPen are extraordinarily high.133 For instance, in fiscal year 2014, the
FDA received nearly 1,600 applications for approval of new generic
drugs, but by the end of the fiscal year none had been approved.134
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies have a host of tactics that they
regularly employ to delay the introduction of generic substitutes to their
patent-expiring drugs.135 Finally, provisions of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) require insurance companies to provide coverage for prescription
drugs, and a prescription drug coverage gap in Medicare Part D was
closed.136 These provisions dramatically increased the demand for
prescription drugs, and the ACA did nothing to increase the supply or
otherwise regulate pharmaceutical companies. In short, U.S. laws
virtually guarantee that drug prices will be high relative to
manufacturing cost. Trusting a theory of corporate governance to limit
price increases seems misplaced.
All of this suggests that this case highlights flaws in the existing
legal framework. How these flaws should be redressed is beyond the
scope of this article. Perhaps various market failures should be corrected
McLean, The Valeant Meltdown and Wall Street’s Major Drug Problem, VANITY FAIR,
June 5, 2016, www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/the-valeant-meltdown-and-wall-streetsmajor-drug-problem)).
133. See Jeremy A. Greene, Gerard Anderson & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Role of the
FDA in Affordability of Off-Patent Pharmaceuticals, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 461, 461
(2016).
134. Michael Hiltzik, The FDA Can Single-Handedly Reduce Drug Price-Gouging.
Why is It Waiting?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:32 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-fda-can-single-handedly-stop-20160105-column.html
[https://perma.cc/7JQE-AFBK]. This is not an article, of course, to analyze the drug
approval process in the United States, but this reality helps explain how such price
increases can occur in an economy that depends on competition and free market
principles. Regulation is supposed to act as a check against market failures, but in this
instance, regulation is the cause of the market failure.
135. For an excellent analysis of these tactics, see Feldman, supra note 124, at 10.
136. Caitlin Owens, Why Prescriptions Drugs Aren’t Part of Obamacare, MORNING
CONSULT (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2016/03/24/whyprescription-drugs-arent-part-of-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/PWG4-6Y8A].
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in order to create a more competitive market for prescription drugs.
Maybe the government should impose price controls on certain
pharmaceutical products. For our purposes, the point is that these steps
can all be taken within the existing shareholder primacy paradigm. As
we argued earlier, no serious theory, moral or legal, would say that
directors should maximize shareholder value no matter what. The
existing legal paradigm can and does accommodate those cases in which
common public sentiment and the shared moral judgment of various
moral theories reject as immoral the directive to maximize profit.
Perhaps these accommodations appear to be too piecemeal and ad hoc.
Perhaps there is a superior paradigm that more elegantly matches the
law to our shared moral judgments in a way that is both intuitive and
operational. Perhaps. But, this superior alternative has yet to be
articulated.
III. THE LAWYER’S DUTY TO ZEALOUSLY REPRESENT THE CLIENT:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
Like directors, lawyers are fiduciaries for their clients, owing
clients the same fiduciary duties that directors owe to their corporations.
Indeed, the common understanding is that lawyers have a duty to
“zealously” represent their clients. Much has been written on the
lawyer’s duty, including a rich literature on whether the lawyer may
deviate from the duty of zealous representation.137 This literature exists
because lawyers, like directors, often face what might be termed as
moral dilemmas. For instance, may a defense counsel, without the
consent of the client, disclose to the plaintiff’s lawyer that the latter is
laboring under a misunderstanding of the law when the result of the
disclosure will be that the defendant will likely have to increase a
settlement offer?138 Of course, disclosure under these circumstances is
contrary to the notion of zealous representation and so must be justified
on some basis. One could make a moral argument that disclosure is
137. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT: Preamble & Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system.”). See, e.g., Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 606 (Mich. 1981)
(noting that a “reasonableness” standard to judge a lawyer’s advocacy would be
“difficult to reconcile with the lawyer’s obligation to represent his client’s interests
zealously. ‘Zealous representation’ contemplates that the lawyer will go to the limits for
his client, representing him loyally, tenaciously and single-mindedly.”).
138. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
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appropriate because otherwise there will be a perversion of justice. But
to make this argument, one must also define and cabin the basis for the
exception. What sort of moral exceptions to zealous representation are
appropriate?
Scholars grappling with this question have generated a plethora of
explanations. For instance, Professor Tim Dare has argued that lawyers
operate within a system designed to assure that society’s institutions
function properly and, in that context, the “role of the lawyer is to allow
clients to avail themselves of rights allocated to them by social
institutions.”139 But, Dare sees this as limiting the lawyer’s role to acting
with “mere-zeal,” eschewing “hyper-zeal.”140 The line between the two
is nuanced, but the conclusion is that the lawyer would be restrained
from acting in the best interests of the client to the extent that those
interests exceed that to which the client is “entitled.” Therefore, in the
disclosure hypothetical above, the lawyer could disclose to opposing
counsel (to his client’s detriment) the legal misunderstanding. Other
scholars have similarly identified various theories to limit a lawyer’s
duty of loyalty to her client in order to further some moral objective.141
The fundamental shortcoming of these theories is they fail to
grapple with the underlying question of why lawyers have a duty of
zealous representation in the first instance. Logically, when one
identifies what underlies the duty, one can more easily consider whether,
and to what extent, exceptions to the duty may be made. In his article, A
Private Law Defense to the Ethic of Zeal, Professor Charles Silver
persuasively argues that a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent a client is
a simple application of traditional, well-established agency law
principles.142 Further, those principles do not allow the lawyer to act on
ethical or moral concerns not otherwise embodied in the law without the
client’s consent. Why? As any fiduciary, the lawyer must act in the best
interests of his client. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, to a
large extent, codify the common law fiduciary duties and, with certain
limited exceptions, do not permit a lawyer to make disclosures or
otherwise take actions that are contrary to the client’s interests unless

139. Tim Dare, Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal, and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers, 7
LEGAL ETHICS 24, 32 (2004).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Charles Silver, A Private Law Defense to the Ethic of Zeal 8 (Univ. Tex. L.
Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 638, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2728326.
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the client gives informed consent.143 It is beyond the scope of this article
to further consider the theories that might or might not justify the duty
of zealous representation. Rather, we will consider to what extent the
robust version of the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation may inform
the way directors act.
In our view, the short answer is, like lawyers, directors have a
robust duty to act in the best interest of the corporation that they serve.
Their power to act and legitimacy emanates from their “contract” with
their shareholders, and unless that contract contains exceptions, the
shareholders’ reasonable expectation that the directors will act in the
best interests of the corporation. Importantly, the articles of
incorporation or bylaws (or even a shareholder-approved resolution) can
alter that expectation, but the absence of such a modification leaves the
morally troubled director with little choice other than resignation, much
like a lawyer who is troubled by a course of action that the client insists
the lawyer pursue. In the disclosure hypothetical noted above—where
opposing counsel is laboring under a misunderstanding of the law—the
lawyer cannot make a disclosure because of the likely harm to her client;
her only choice is to resign.144
Are there differences between a lawyer and a director that might
give a director greater freedom to act in a way that may not be in the
corporation’s best interests? Directors are not technically agents of the
shareholders, or for that matter, agents of the corporation; rather, the
position of directors is sui generis.145 While true, this observation begs
the question, because even though directors are not agents, they are
fiduciaries and the salient inquiries are the content and source of those
duties. There is little dispute that directors owe duties of loyalty, care,
and good faith.146 Like a lawyer who must make a personal and moral
decision of whether to represent a particular client, the critical point for
a director is deciding whether to serve as a director. And, like a lawyer
who is generally free to withdraw from a representation if continuing to
do so is morally repugnant, the director is free to resign from her seat.

143. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). The exception
to this rule is narrow, including, but not limited to, that there would be imminent death
or substantial bodily harm if the client’s information is not disclosed. Id.
144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
146. See In re Trados, Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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There is one salient difference between lawyers and directors worth
considering. The lawyer faced with a moral dilemma, such as the
disclosure hypothetical, can and should consult her client. The client, for
any number of reasons, may decide that disclosure is appropriate and so
notify the lawyer. A director of a publicly-held corporation does not
have that luxury in most instances. While a board of directors can refer a
matter to the shareholders for an advisory vote or a binding
determination, this is an unusual and expensive procedure. Moreover, it
is somewhat awkward: Shareholders have elected the directors to make
the business decisions for the corporation and ought not to be called
upon to do the directors’ work.147 Thus, directors are guided by the
fiduciary obligations and work without the “safety net” that lawyers
have in the form of consulting with and gaining the consent of clients.
Since directors cannot consult with the beneficiaries of their
fiduciary duties, ought they be free to guess whether their shareholders
would opt not to maximize profits in a particular circumstance? This,
too, seems like an avoidance of a fiduciary duty. The director’s duty is
not to do what the majority of shareholders might think best, but rather
to do what the director believes is in the corporation’s best interests.
This concept finds support in the doctrine that a majority of shareholders
cannot ratify a transaction that constitutes corporate waste; only
unanimous shareholder approval can do so.148
Although there may be circumstances in which maximizing profit
clearly contradicts the director’s moral judgment, and even our
collective moral judgment, there does not seem to be any way to
operationalize the notion that, in these circumstances, the director
should follow her own moral judgment, other than to allow the director
to resign under these circumstances. To legally condone directors
knowingly frustrating the profitability of their firm would be equivalent,
in our view, to condoning lawyers knowingly frustrating their clients’
legal success.
IV. THE MARKET FAILURE THEORY
In his recent book, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM,
Professor Joseph Heath offers a fresh approach to the debate about

147. Of course, it is a different matter if the directors have a conflict of interest, or
the corporate statute mandates shareholder approval.
148. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219 (Del. 1979).
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director decision-making.149 He notes that stakeholder theorists do not
adequately consider the importance of corporate law when arguing for
stakeholder protections. If a firm’s managers favor non-shareholder
constituents and its competitors do not, it will experience lower profits
and become a target for hostile takeover. Heath explains that adherence
to a norm of corporate social responsibility “significantly complicate[s]
the agency relationships” between managers and the corporation, and he
points to state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) as proof. SOEs are
unsuccessful from a profit perspective, and a social responsibility
perspective as well,150 because the managers have a multi-task problem.
As there is “no common metric that can be used in a [triple bottom
line]151 context for evaluating social and environmental performance
relevant to other stakeholders . . . it is very difficult to see how any
reform of corporate law designed to permit managers to pursue a [triple
bottom line] agenda would not also open the door to rampant
malfeasance.”152 Similarly, the fact that managers are accountable to
more than one principal (Multi-Principal Problems) frees them from
accountability to any principal. Heath also convincingly discusses the
experience of SOEs in this regard.153
Heath responds to these deficiencies with his “market failure
approach,” which starts from the presumption that economies based on
free markets are relatively efficient at allocating goods and services.
This is because free markets generate accurate pricing of such goods and
services. Efficient markets, however, depend on an accepted set of rules
or norms binding on competitors in the marketplace. Heath suggests ten
such rules, one of which is that competitors minimize negative
externalities; costs associated with the goods or services they produce
that are not factored into the price at which those goods and services are
offered. The classic example is goods that are produced in a way that
generates carbon emissions which, in turn, contribute to global warming.
Unless that effect is somehow factored into the price, the price of the
goods will not accurately reflect all production costs. Thus, the
efficiency of the market is reduced. To counter this result and to ensure
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the efficient allocation of goods and services to address this “market
failure,” corporate managers have a moral obligation to act in a way that
might not maximize profits, but will internalize the full cost of their
product.
Heath presents an elegant and forceful argument, but one that is
ultimately unsatisfying as an alternative to the existing shareholder
primacy paradigm in corporate law. Just as a firm’s attention to a triple
bottom line will disadvantage it if its competitors are not similarly
constrained, the market failure approach requires adherence by all
competitors. Heath responds to this obvious shortcoming by suggesting
ways this may be avoided, including legislation to allow firms to collude
on non-productive forms of competition.154 But this and other
suggestions provide only theoretical ways that managers might behave
consistently with the market failure approach. As a practical matter, how
would managers have to behave in the absence of such legislation?
Typically, managers look for and exploit competitive advantages; the
market failure approach presents a rationale for them to avoid doing so,
but not a convincing reason that they in fact will.
For this reason, we find Heath’s market failure approach to be a
welcome and promising addition to the ethical question of what the
purpose of a corporation is and what obligations it places on directors
and managers. However, we also find it is not a satisfying alternative to
shareholder primacy as the operant legal paradigm. Indeed, Heath’s
approach is not too far off from a more ethically sophisticated
understanding of shareholder primacy—that is, one like ours that
acknowledges the need for ethical constraints on the underlying
presumption of a profit motive. Heath’s idea that corporate directors
have a moral obligation to eschew decisions that create Pareto
inefficiencies, for example by rent-seeking behavior, could be repurposed under the existing framework by highlighting the need for
additional regulation in exactly these sorts of circumstances. We
imagine that there would be widespread, shared moral judgment that
Pareto inefficient corporate behavior, like regulatory capture or
monopolizing a market, is wrong or at least morally questionable. If that
behavior is not legally prohibited, then the shared moral judgement
constraint should be invoked, and new regulation crafted.
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V. DELAWARE LAW: THE BLASIUS CASE
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,155 Chancellor William
Allen, writing for the Delaware Chancery Court, identified the essence
of the shareholder-director relationship which, if accepted, explains (and
constrains) the directors’ authority to act. In that case, the Atlas board of
directors rejected a restructuring proposed by Blasius, one of its
shareholders.156 In response, and in order to realize its proposed
restructuring, Blasius decided to obtain control of the Atlas board.157
Blasius sought to persuade Atlas shareholders to consent to an
expansion of the Atlas board and to the election of Blasius’s nominees
to the newly created positions.158 The Atlas board moved swiftly to
thwart the plan by amending its bylaws, expanding the size of the board,
and adding its own nominees to the vacancies.159 Blasius sued for an
injunction and prevailed.160
In an incisive opinion, Chancellor Allen posed these facts in the
starkest terms: He assumed that the Atlas board of directors was
unconflicted, fully informed, and acted in good faith—the prerequisites
that normally indicate a court will not interfere with the directors’
judgment.161 Allen added that he was “inclined to think [the Blasius
restructuring proposal] was not . . . sound.”162 The issue, then, was
whether, under such circumstances, the Atlas board could act “for the
principal purpose of preventing the [shareholder] from electing a
majority of new directors.”163 Chancellor Allen concluded that they
could not, because the shareholders’ statutory power to elect directors
provides the directors’ authority to act for the corporation: “[T]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”164 In other words, the directors
cannot interfere with the shareholder voting process because their
legitimacy depends on it. In that respect, the corporate voting construct
155.
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160.
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164.
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is not unlike the political process; a candidate who, say, interferes with
voters casting their ballots loses all legitimacy to represent them. It is
hard to argue with Allen’s analysis, which is grounded in both logic and
Delaware’s corporate statute.
For present purposes, then, the question is the extent this limitation
on director power informs the ability of directors to act in other
circumstances. Must directors act to further the interests of
shareholders? A couple of points are worth noting. First, Chancellor
Allen was untroubled by the lack of a formal principal-agent
relationship between the shareholders and directors.165 Indeed, he used
those terms to describe the relationship. Second, applying traditional
agency principles, the agent must act in the best interests of the
principal. To the extent that courts defer to the business judgments of
directors, they do so because courts lack the expertise that directors
presumably have. But, those business judgments must be in the best
interests of the corporation and, by extension, in the best interests of the
shareholders.166 A board decision that the shareholder can prove did not
meet this standard will, like the decision of the Atlas board, be subject to
injunction.167
CONCLUSION: DO WE NEED NEW NORMS?
In this article, we sought to establish whether and how the
corporation should act in a more socially responsible fashion. If
directors are to deviate from the norm that they are bound to act in the
corporation’s best interests, then what justifies that deviation? This
article considers a range of possible justifications: stakeholder theory,
the team production theory, individual moral judgment, and the market
failure rationale. All are found wanting as alternatives to the existing
legal paradigm that assumes that maximizing shareholder value is a
legitimate aim of directors.
The existing shareholder primacy paradigm is only plausible if we
allow the need for some moral constraints based on publicly widespread
shared moral judgments. This constraint allows shareholder primacy to
plausibly navigate cases like the EpiPen controversy, where the course
that maximizes shareholder value seems immoral to too many
stakeholders and observers. Besides the need for ethically informed
165.
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legal constraints on maximizing profit, it is also available to directors
under the operant paradigm to resign in protest if their personal moral
judgments conflict with maximizing shareholder value, analogous to
how a lawyer may resign rather than zealously represent a client when
that representation conflicts with her personal moral judgment. To
legally operationalize the alternative, in which it is at a lawyer or a
director’s discretion to contradict their fiduciary duties, would be
unacceptable given the lack of a serious alternative to the agency law
principles that inform a lawyer’s duty of zealous representation. Those
principles underpin the leading Delaware case, Blasius, which clearly
articulates the source of director authority and its limitations.
Those who wish to see a change in this status quo should do more
than just argue why it is a good idea. Delaware law, which governs the
majority of publicly held corporations (where the call for social
responsibility is most intense and consequential) does not currently give
directors that unbounded discretion. The real challenge for those seeking
the change, then, is to persuade the Delaware legislature to change its
law, perhaps by adding an other-constituency provision. While that
seems unlikely, proponents of change might turn to benefit corporations.
One of the authors of this article has written of the promise of this new
option, which mandates that corporate directors factor into their
decisions the interests and concerns of a wide range of stakeholders,
including the environment and society at large.168 The mere fact that the
Delaware legislature has recently added provisions in its law allowing
for the creation of benefit corporations (called “public benefit
corporations” in Delaware) only strengthens the conclusion that the
realm of traditional corporations remains profit maximization and
shareholder primacy. It is even harder to argue now that the directors of
a traditional Delaware corporation may take into account the effect of
their decisions on non-shareholder constituencies, unless there are
benefits that accrue to shareholders from such accounting.

168. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge to Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1007 (2013).

